Arrivals, Frontex and the political tool of Criminalization of drivers
Lampedusa, as the transit point of many people on the move, is an important place in the fight against borders. We want to give you some insights into what we could see while living on the island and creating links to the other side of the sea. How is the situation in Tunisia and Libya affecting the arrivals in Lampedusa? How are the border dynamics on the island evolving, and what reality are people facing when reaching Lampedusa and Italy?
Arrivals seen from Lampedusa
Between January and Mid-April around 8 750 people arrived in Lampedusa. Arrivals strongly depend on the weather conditions. During brief windows of good weather, increased crossings can be observed, as the journey becomes less threatening. The Mediterranean, however, remains one of the deadliest migration routes worldwide. On the first weekend of April, such a weather window opened and 1 500 people arrived in Lampedusa within only two days. At the same time, the dynamics in the departure countries play a big role.
While the number of people arriving in Lampedusa stayed almost the same compared to last year, an immense shift has been observed regarding the point of departure. Since autumn 2024, arrivals from Tunisia have decreased with a worrying consistency, to the point where no boat reached Lampedusa in January. A boat arrived in February and four others in March, among which the shipwreck of 18.03.25, where 7 bodies were recovered and 39 people are still missing.
Frontex coast guards in the port of Lampedusa
According to our data, in 2025, a total of 182 people who departed from Tunisia reached Lampedusa, compared to 2.224 people in the same period in 2024.
All the arrivals in 2025 departed from Sfax. During these months, we observed the disappearance of former Tunisian departure points such as Monastir, Teboulba, Mahdia, Chebba, Kerkennah, and Djerba. These coastal cities have a historical key role in the migration of the central Mediterranean. After the EU and Tunisia signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2023, authorities have expanded their presence across these regions. The intensification of criminalization and imprisonment has thus rendered many kilometers of the Tunisian coast unusable for departures.
These departure points for reaching Italy have, in the past months, turned into zones of repression and obstruction of departures. This has resulted in a forced geographical shift further south, making the journey longer, more dangerous, and nearly impossible. The outcome is existential: fewer departure points, with tighter control enforced by both local and European authorities, are leading to an increase in violent interceptions. People are trapped in Tunisia. People from Central and Western Africa additionally face another border in the shape of structural racism and are stuck in a limbo: They are obliged to accept to live in dangerous conditions within the olive camps and constantly risk deportation to the desert or accept the so-called “voluntary return” programs managed by IOM.
While arrivals from Tunisia drastically decrease for the above reasons, people are still managing to arrive in Lampedusa from Libya: 56 boats arrived in January, 32 in February and 26 in March. Most departures originated from Libyan northwestern coastal towns. According to our data, 2/3 of the boats came from Zuwara, 1/4 from Sabratha and only a few from Zawiya. While now all the boats are coming from these places, during the same months last year, boats from Libya were also departing from Tajoura and Ras Ajdir.
Frontex activities in Lampedusa
Focusing on Lampedusa, we can see the externalisation of borders in the overall presence of Frontex on the island. Since 2006, Frontex has been active here, hosting one of the largest Frontex operations called Themis in 2018 and gradually expanding their area of influence. Over the last years Frontex has deployed more Coastal Patrol Boats for maritime surveillance. As of April 2025, four vessels are operating, with national coast guards from Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, and Romania.
These actors take part in joint training exercises with Italian authorities, such as the Italian Coast Guard and the Guardia di Finanza. All of the patrol boats are involved in Law enforcement procedures at sea and the number of patrolling hours are expected to increase according to Frontex. Speaking of the various coast guards—particularly the Swedish one—it is important to highlight that, during sea rescue operations, they are equipped with firearms, which we believe are out of place in such a context.
Italy has increased its collaboration with Frontex in recent years. More than 40 Frontex officers and staff are currently on Lampedusa, assisting Italian authorities with the identification and registration of the arriving people. Their inland teams, mainly composed of Frontex officers and cultural mediators, operate both within the Lampedusa hotspot and directly on the pier, where they begin the so-called ‘screening operations’. During these operations, they collect detailed information about the journey—how people reached Lampedusa and what tools they used to navigate – all in preparation for the ‘debriefing sessions’ held in the Frontex office inside the hotspot, aimed at identifying possible drivers and facilitators.
At the same time, Frontex uses two planes and one helicopter, flying two to five times a day. They monitor the Tunisian and Libyan corridor daily, constantly searching for boats. During these flights, they not only spot vessels but also take pictures to collect data on the boats and to identify potential drivers. The aerial surveillance conducted by the EU border agency Frontex enables increased tracking of boats at sea, with coordinates and information often forwarded to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard. This cooperation once again puts lives at risk, as people fleeing Libya are intercepted and forcibly returned, violating the principle of non-refoulement.
Frontex and European Agencies in Tunisia
While we do not yet have full clarity on Frontex’s aerial involvement with Tunisian authorities operating at sea, there are strong indications of the agency’s growing interest in collaborating with Tunisia. Multiple visits have been made by Tunisian officials and delegations from the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs to Frontex headquarters. In addition to that, Frontex has deployed a European Migration Liaison Officer to the EU Delegation in Tunis since 2018. Meanwhile, officers from Tunisia’s Anti-Crime Police Brigade of al-Gorjani have also been present in recent years, working alongside Italian police and Frontex officials within the Lampedusa hotspot, to enhance tools and methods for identifying criminalised profiles on both sides of the shore.
These developments are in line with public statements by Italy, Austria, and other EU Member States regarding increased logistical support for Tunisia’s maritime forces (Garde Nationale Maritime, supported by ICMPD in the framework of the ‘Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region’), with the explicit goal of blocking departures from the country’s coast. What is being promoted is a continuous exchange and growing transfer of knowledge, techniques, and strategies aimed at improving the “effectiveness” of preventing people from leaving Tunisia, a country ruled by an authoritarian police regime. In April 2025, more than 40 opposition figures were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 13 to 66 years on charges of conspiracy against the state and attempting to overthrow President Kais Saied. At the same time, people on the move from West and Central Africa face daily police violence, structural racism, and a high risk of deportation and abuse under the border regime.
The EU regardless, continues to label Tunisia as ‘safe’, primarily in pursuit of its interests. As the Frontex Executive Director stated: “Together, we embrace the shared responsibility of safeguarding the EU’s external borders.” His words make it clear: surveillance operations deployed by the agency have never been about ensuring the safety of people on the move, but rather about protecting European territory from their arrival.
The criminalisation of those who facilitate the journey seen from the pier
Another method of border management is the criminalization of those who facilitate the journey. In 2024 the majority of arrests of boat drivers happened in the ports located along Eastern Sicily (Pozzallo, Syracuse) and the Calabrian Ionian coast (Roccella and Crotone). Second most arrests took place in Marsala, Agrigento, Ragusa, Catania and Leuca. The arrests usually occur directly after the disembarkation or on the same day.
View from the Maldusa station in Lampedusa
On the 9th of April, justafter disembarkinga ship of the civil fleet in Salerno port,three Egyptians went into pre-trial detention on the basis of the testimonies of other passengers and possible videos and photos from the journey. We want to take this recent incident, which is a recurring issue, as a reminder of the reality that many people face after reaching Italian/ European shores. For many people, arriving in Italy doesn’t mean safety, but up to 30 years in prisons and often afterwards going to detention centres for deportation (CPR) for a maximum of 18 months.Most of the criminalization of drivers happens in ports, where also civil fleet ships are disembarking. People that just arrived after a dangerous journey are being interrogated via direct and indirect questions to find different hints for possible accusations. As civil actors, it is our responsibility to try as best as we can to prevent these arrests from happening by prioritizing giving proper knowledge to equip them to resist. We urgently call civil fleet actors to keep in mind the reality people are facing after disembarking and for collective reflection on to what extent Italy and Europe can be considered safe.
Accusations are often directed solely on the ground of nationality. That ends up in a clear tendency to target the minorities of nationalities on the boat. The largest group who was accused of boat driving in 2024 were Egyptian citizens, according to the report “From sea to prison”. The second-largest group targeted was from East Africa (Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea), followed by Tunisia. Moreover, people who come from countries that are related to fishing are often targeted because of possible nautical knowledge, such as Gambian, Sudanese, Senegalese, Tunisian, Egyptian and Moroccan people.
The penalty system of Italy and other European states follows a racist narrative. Authorities are applying racial profiling and furthermore, people accused of facilitating freedom of movement do not have the same rights as European citizens. While often sole suspicion seems to be enough for detention, the accusations are based on insufficient proof. It disregards the complex and dangerous reality people are facing in the departure countries.
Often people keep on reporting that they did not have the choice to drive the boat. A young Ethiopian man in April 2025 told us: “You don’t have a choice to drive the boat. The Libyans tell you, with the gun in their hands, that you have to drive the boat. If you don’t do it, they will shoot you.” And even when individuals choose to be the drivers, because of their previous experience and nautical knowledge, they share the perilous journey of the crossing. The lives of people are being used as a political tool, not seeing the reality of migration dynamics. Allowing others to not die at sea and reaching the Italian shores. How can Europe justify criminalizing drivers and solidarity for such an existential part of seeking freedom?
Maldusa Project
Website: https://www.maldusa.org
